This paper develops a macroeconomic model of real-nancial market interactions in which the credit and the business cycles reinforce each other according to a bidirectional causal relationship. We do so in the context of a computational agent-based framework, where the channelling of funds from savers to investors occurring through intermediaries is aected by information frictions. Since banks compete in both the deposit and the loan markets, the whole dynamics is driven by endogenous uctuations in the size of the intermediaries balance sheet. We use the model to show that nancial crisis are particularly harmful when hitting in phase with a real recession, and that when this occurs the loss in real output is permanent.
Introduction
Credit to non-nancial businesses and households is notoriously pro-cyclical (Covas & Haan 2011 , Schularick & Taylor 2012 , a fact that in the last three decades has attracted a huge amount of theoretical work meant to explore the channels linking nancial ows to real macroeconomic activity (Foglia et al. 2011 ). The received pre-2007 approach was centered on the idea that the causality runs from changes in the real sector to movements in nancial ows, whereas nancial frictions impinging on the borrowers' capacity amplify the macroeconomic impact of exogenous shocks to productivity or preferences (Bernanke & Gertler 1989 , Greenwald & Stiglitz 1993 , Kiyotaki & Moore 1997 . In turn, the bulk of the research emerged after the global nancial crisis has oered theories pointing toward an inversion of the causality nexus.
In the models surveyed in e.g. Brunnermeier et al. (2013) and Christiano & Ikeda (2011) , a shrinkage in the total amount of funds channelled from lenders to borrowers derives from disruptions in nancial markets due to shocks aecting either banks' capital or liquidity. Recessions are therefore the outcome of a cut in spending and hiring by borrowers generated by a supply-induced credit tightening.
In this paper we present an agent-based computational model in which the owing of funds from savers to investors is intermediated by a stream of banks competing in fully decentralized markets for deposits and loans, where the only friction aecting agents is that they are imperfectly aware of the economic opportunities they potentially face. In our setting, the transmission channel between the nancial and the real sectors turns out to be bidirectional, while cyclical uctuations emerge endogenously as intermediaries adjust the size of their balance sheet to the varying competitive conditions aecting the asset and liability sides, respectively. In particular, banks compete on prices either to attract demand deposits from households and to oer long-term but freely severable -credit contracts to rms, so that the net interest margin represents a key state variable indicating the viability of the banking sector while transforming maturities. Due to search costs in locating protable opportunities, the economy is aected by matching and allocation imperfections that co-evolve endogenously, giving rise to large reallocations of credit among rms on a regular basis. The dynamics of credit creation and destruction are related to the relative strength of economic activity, however. This is due to the ensuing complementarity between the number of active bank-rm relationships and the savers' incentive to provide funds to intermediaries, which returns a pro-cyclical average productivity.
The time paths we obtain through simulations show that the statistical features of the gross ows of credit, as well as its aggregate volume, are in line with those observed in real data. Interestingly enough, this result is obtained in a simplied framework completely abstracting from agency frictions, aggregate disturbances to primitive parameters, time-varying risk taking due to capital regulation or institutional arrangements like a deposit guarantee or a LOLR authority.
Having established the general features of the relationship linking the credit and the business cycles, we go on to investigate how a nancial crisis here modelled as a funding run leading to the disruption of one or more banks aects the macroeconomic performance. We nd that the interplay of credit creation and destruction associated to a nancial turmoil generates downturns that are deeper and more prolonged, that the subsequent rebound can be insucient to regain pre-crises output levels, and that these eects are more pronounced when the nancial crisis coincides with a real downturn. Thus, our model presents two implications corroborated by the empirical evidence: 1) nancial crisis can lead to permanent output losses (BoysenHogrefe et al. 2016) ; 2) banking crises operate as a factor limiting aggregate activity distinct from standard recessions (Dell'Ariccia et al. 2008 ).
While close in spirit to the stream of research dealing with equilibrium search in credit markets (Diamond 1990 , Den Haan et al. 2003 , Wasmer & Weil 2004 , Becsi et al. 2013 , our model is rmly rooted in the tradition of the agent-based literature exploring the emergence of macroeconomic features from the localized interactions of heterogeneous agents employing decentralized matching and bargaining protocols (Fagiolo et al. 2004 , Gaeo et al. 2008 , Riccetti et al. 2015 , Guerini et al. 2018 ). This approach oers us two key advantages. First, we can extend the macroeconomic-oriented analysis of credit allocation from a static multiple equilibria framework to a dynamic one, where credit mismatches develop from feedback eects as agents interact in distinct but interrelated customer markets (Gottfries 1991) . Second, beyond overcoming the need to postulate an exogenously-given matching technology, we provide accurate sensitivity analyses to analyse how macroeconomic outcomes are aected by banks' behavior in extending credit.
Our ndings are also related to two other broad streams of literature.
First, a large body of empirical research has persuasively shown that the dynamic process of credit reallocation across heterogeneous rms is an intense and pervasive phenomenon, that its magnitude and volatility dwarf that of the total volume of credit, and that it plays a signicant role in determining the strength of macroeconomic activity and real growth rates (Jayaratne & Strahan 1996 , Herrera et al. 2011 , Inklaar et al. 2015 . The reshuing of nancial resources across rms due to the creation and destruction of bank debt is particularly compressed during episodes of nancial turmoil (Contessi & Francis 2013 , Hyun 2016 , signalling that the interplay between resource misallocation and the endogenous worsening of nancial frictions is at the heart of the deep and prolonged periods of low resource utilization following acute nancial crises (Hall 2011 , Bordo & Haubrich 2017 .
We add to this essentially empirical literature by providing a theoretical justication for these stylized facts. In particular, we show that the intense credit reallocation observed in real data can be traced back not only to the way intermediaries compete in the market for loans, but also to the feedback exerted on it by the fact that banks also struggle to attract depositors as they set their passive interest rates.
Second, a rapidly growing body of work has stressed the role of nancial intermediaries' balance sheets both as shock ampliers and as a source of uctuations in economic activity (Boyarchenko et al. 2015 , Brunnermeier & Koby 2016 . Accordingly, using data for the USA Adrian & Shin (2010) show how uctuations in the balance sheets of nancial institutions possess forecasting power for future GDP growth, while the evidence provided by suggests the presence of a causal chain running from the term spread, moving to the net interest margin of banks, advancing to lending volumes and nally reaching real growth. We complement this literature by highlighting a dierent channel linking uctuations in the size of intermediaries' balance sheets and uctuations in real activity. In addition to the risk-taking and the leverage channels explored so far, we advance an explanation in which the net interest margin registered by banks evolves in cycles because of a competition channel driven by a complementarity between nancial intermediation and aggregate investment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and provides a discussion of the initial conditions used in simulations. Section 3 takes stock of simulation results to highlight the existence of endogenous and co-evolving business and nancial cycles. Section 4 extends the basic model by examining the eects of exogenously determined bank runs. Section 5 concludes and outlines directions for further research.
The model
The economy is composed of a xed number of households (h = 1, . . . , n h ), intermediaries (i = 1, . . . , n i ) and rms (f = 1, . . . , n f ). Households are endowed with accumulable wealth, which we assume for simplicity as the only factor of production, while rms have no resources of their own and must raise funds on the credit market to start production. Families deposit their wealth in only one intermediary at time as demand deposits and they can not establish direct connections with producing rms. Here we are implicitly assuming that investment evaluation and ex-post verication is costly and intermediaries are more ecient than households in performing these tasks.
In addition to this, we assume that the nancial sector can supply credit without sustaining any additional eort or expense. On the other hand, households can always search a new counterpart and they can move their wealth from an intermediary to another without constraints.
As in Den Haan et al. (2003) intermediaries supply credit to rms through a simple contract in which a xed portion of the production (P i,f ) is left to the entrepreneur as payment for the eort. From the point of view of the entrepreneur this value can be interpreted both as a measure of rm protability P i,f and of nancing costs
is the production function and k i,f is the external nance supplied by the i-th intermediary to the f-th rm. The level of prot (P i,f ) and the loan size (k i,f ) are set at the beginning of the open-ended credit relation and they are not modied through time 1 . On the other hand, both the intermediary and the rm can close a credit contract in any moment. Specically, the former will reduce its investment when it requires additional liquidity to pay back its depositors, while the latter will search for another intermediary whenever it observes in the market new contracts which pay an higher average prot (P t ).
Finally, we assume that entrepreneurs have a reserve utility (θ) and sustain a cost (x) each time they search for a new counterpart. This reserve utility can be interpreted as a home production level which is not included in the aggregate production calculations. As we will explain later on, entrepreneurs will thus have the incentive to demand credit and start a market activity only if the new rm with external nancing will return an expected 1 Entrepreneur which are not borrowing have P i,f = θ and k i,f = 0, where θ is the reserve utility which we will dene later in the text. level of prots higher than their reserve value. To further simplify the model, we assume also that both the home and the market activities require the same level of eort from the entrepreneur. In this way the only discriminants in entrepreneurs' choices can be found in their reserve utility and in the search cost. In addition to this, we force intermediaries to nance the search cost of new lenders for the rst period (see Table 1 ). In this way the value of the rm, and consequently of the credit relationship, increases through time, in line with the literature on relationship banking (see e.g. Boot (2000) for a review).
Notice that in this framework intermediaries react to the behaviour of households and rms. From the liabilities side, families can move their wealth across intermediaries without any constraint, while on the assets side entrepreneurs can shift from the current lender to a new one every time they observe a better nancing opportunity in the market. As stated before, in this choice rms must take into account the search cost. In particular, an entrepreneur will look for a new counterpart if
where we assume that rms discount future cash ows considering the current market interest rate (R t ) as xed and constant through time. In addition to this, entrepreneurs use average prots (P t ) as a proxy for evaluating new loans and do not take account of the probability of future rescissions of the contract.
At the beginning of the world families have an homogeneous quantity of wealth d h,0 = W 0 (∀h = 1, . . . , n h ) which they deposit in a bank selected at random. We dene the subset of households connected to the i-th intermediary at time t as H i,t , hence for t = 0 we have
Intermediaries set an initial contractual prot P i,0 = θ + xR 0 , x a minimum investment dimensionk i,0 , evaluate the resources available for investments and generate a credit supply schedule 3 .
We dene minimum investment dimension as the lowest value of capital which produces a non negative interest rate:
We 2 Firms which have just started a new credit relation (t = 1) must satisfy the condition:
3 We set the initial contractual prot P i,0 = θ + xR 0 to start the model with a value corresponding to the long term zero prot condition 
Firm value
the rm start a new credit relation at time t = 0 and considers the current interest rate (R t ) as xed and constant through time. Because of bounded rationality the entrepreneur does not take account of the probability of future rescissions of the contract. From a theoretical point of view, however, this assumption allows us also to dene deposits as truly risk-free, in the sense that the capital quota is always repaid.
The credit supply of every intermediary is then computed according to a stochastic allocation process. The quantity of available resources is simply given by the sum of the initial deposits
Lastly, rms demand for funds and start production. Given that at this stage all the intermediaries oer the same contractual prot, we allocate credit across entrepreneurs at random. In other words, we extract the composition of the initial credit network with probabilities Pr(f
, where F i,t is the set of rms connected with the i-th intermediary at time t.
Once the system starts the economy evolves recursively following the subsequent steps in each iteration:
1. Entrepreneurs start production, retain prots and return to lenders the interest rate:
The average productivity of the economy is then dened as:
2. Intermediaries collect the stream of income produced by their investments and calculate the active interest rate:
4 Degenerate equilibria usually are the eects of an excessive reaction of the system in the early phases of the simulation. A possible solution to this problem would have been to use a larger number of agents to avoid initial jumps and thus have a smoother transition, but from a computational point of view the system would have become excessively costly. 5 We dene I new i
as the set of new loans supplied by the i-th intermediary.
and its counterpart on deposits:
where the return obtained from the nancing of the search cost is in-
The aggregate active and passive interest rates are then dened through the weighted averages:
3. Households observe the return obtained on deposits, consume and allocate capital. Specically, families receive the interest rate paid by their corresponding intermediary, namely r h,t = r d i,t with h ∈ H i,t , and maximize the intertemporal problem:
whose solutions are:
Subsequently, households search at random a new intermediary such
Notice that the combination of this mechanism with the minimum investment condition ensures that families will always allocate their wealth to an active intermediary. In fact, banks without deposits will not have the resources to supply credit and will not pay any interest.
On the contrary, intermediaries with a positive balance sheet will return a positive, even if small, income stream to their depositors.
Therefore, in this framework non-performing banks will only exit from the economy. Indeed, households will slowly withdraw all their deposits from sub-optimal intermediaries, up to the point when all the resources in those banks will be completely depleted. From that moment on those intermediaries will no longer be selected by the families because of the zero interest rate. This condition is necessary to grant the emergence of an endogenous bargaining power among agents.
4. Intermediaries evaluate liquidity, modify the contractual prot on new loans and supply credit.
The term liquidity (L i,t ) indicates the amount of unallocated resources available for investments in each intermediary at the beginning of every period. This value is given by the dierence between the current level of deposits and the portfolio of investments inherited from the preceding period:
When an intermediary experiences an excessive withdraw of funds, namely when L i,t < 0, it has to reduce lending to repay depositors.
Therefore, a bank in this situation will evaluate the interest rate of each investment and will close the contracts with the lowest return, until the condition
the credit lines with the minimum protability.
Subsequently, intermediaries modify the contractual prot that they will pay on new loans. In particular they follow the rule:
When an intermediary observes an increase in the total amount of deposits it keeps the contractual prot at the level of the previous period.
In fact, it recognizes that it is paying an interest rate higher than the rest of the economy and that it is optimal for it to not modify the conditions which produced that result. Conversely, when it experiences a withdrawal of deposits, the intermediary must understand why it is not able to pay a suciently high return to its investors.
The main driver of this decision is the amount of unallocated capital (U i,t−1 ) accrued in the preceding period. As stated earlier, in this framework it is always optimal for the single intermediary to invest all the available resources to obtain a non-negative interest rate. Hence, an excess of uninvested funds dened here as a positive dierence between the overall quantity of unallocated resources and the minimum investment dimension plus the nancing of the search cost (U i,t−1 ≥k i,t−1 +x)
indicates that the bank it is not oering a suciently competitive contractual prot to the rms. In the opposite situation, the intermediary recognizes that it is leaving an excessively high quota of the production to the entrepreneurs and it is obtaining a sub-optimal return from its investments.
Finally, as in the initialization phase of the economy, intermediaries compute the minimum investment dimension from the new contractual prot (P i,t ) and extract the size of each new loan from the distribution k
5. Firms observe the average contractual prot and evaluate the opportunity cost of changing their counterparts.
The average contractual prot on new loans is dened:
and is updated each time a rm borrows from a bank. Specically, the order of rms acceding to the credit market is extracted at random and when a new loan is issued it is removed from the credit supply schedule. The convenience of searching a new intermediary is then obtained through equation (1) and, if positive, the entrepreneur will look for another counterpart such that:
which implies f / ∈ F i,t ∧ f ∈ F z,t , P i,f = P z,t and k i,f = k new j with j ∈ I new z .
6. Finally, when the credit supply is completely exhausted or there is no more demand for new loans, intermediaries evaluate the nal amount of unallocated resources:
where they subtract also the nancing of the search costs of new borrowers.
As we will explain later in the text, to fully understand the circumstances which generate endogenous credit cycles, it is necessary to focus both on the dynamic of the interest rate dierential and on the denitions of liquidity and unallocated capital.
Starting from the margin of intermediation, by denition the balance sheet equation of each intermediary implies the following economy-wide identity:
In accordance to this, the aggregate interest rate dierential is a function of the overall level of unallocated capital and of the return obtained from investments:
Hence, both a rise in contractual prots and a decline in rms productivity, by reducing the active interest rate, shrink the margin of intermediation. In a similar manner, a contraction in the level of unallocated capital decrease the interest rate dierential.
With regards of the equations for liquidity (12) and unallocated capital (16), it may appear that they represent the same economic dimension. To better understand the dierences between those measures and their economic intuition, they can be rewritten in terms of their past values. Specically, by substituting (12) in (16) we nd:
where we removed for simplicity the nancing of search costs of new borrowers. Similarly, by taking (16) with one period lag and by substituting it in (12) we obtain:
The new versions of the two equations put under light the main drivers of the underling economic dynamic. Specically, with regards of the unallocated capital (U i,t ), it emerges that, given the level of liquidity, the overall amount of uninvested funds left in the banks is determined by entrepreneurs' movements across intermediaries (F i,t−1 → F i,t ). Conversely, the resources available for supplying new credit (L i,t ) are the result of households' investment decisions (H i,t−1 → H i,t ). In other words, movements in the level of unallocated capital (U i,t ) capture the changes in the asset side of the intermediaries balance sheets, while adjustments in the liquidity (L i,t ) provide a proxy for the evolution of banks liabilities.
Simulation results
In this section we will discuss the results obtained from the simulation of the model. Specically, we will focus on the eects of the parameters on the determination of the pseudo steady-state level of the economy and on the dynamic of the endogenous cyclicality of the system.
Initial setting of parameters and sensitivity analysis
As in all agent-based model, in this framework parameters play a major role in the denition of the results and in the emergence of endogenous dynamics.
We hold particular attention on the eects on the system of the rms reserve utility θ and of the intermediaries contractual adjustment factor γ. Indeed, as we will see further in the text, these two parameters modify not only the shape of the cycles and the response of the economy to a bank run, but also the pseudo steady-state level of the system. Conversely, with regards to the search cost x, simulations have shown that modications to this value produce only second order eects. Indeed, from the point of view of the single entrepreneur this search cost is relatively small compared to the expected value of the rm (see Table 1 ). This fact emerges also from conditions (1) and (15): to search and accept a new credit line the dierence between the current and the new contractual prot must be higher than the product xR t . Given that in the pseudo steady-state the interest rate is close to zero, this dampens the eects of the search cost. On the other hand, banks and, in turn, depositors are indierent to the size of this cost because they nance it and obtain a positive return from this investment. In the light of this result, we chose to not explore further this aspect and to x its value to x = 0.1. We set a suciently high number of households (n h = 2000) and rms (n f = 2000), while for the intermediaries (n i = 50) we decide to limit their quantity, to keep the computational complexity of the model at an acceptable level. Indeed, if on the one hand this choice produces slightly irregular initial transition phases, on the other one it returns reasonable results in the long run.
Households parameters are set inside a realistic range. In particular, we choose a discount factor β = 0.95 and an initial capital W 0 = 0.1. Finally, with regards to the production function, we use a common functional form with a decreasing marginal productivity: f (k) = k α where α = 0.3.
We study the pseudo steady-state level of the system on a range of the rms reserve utility θ = [0.05, 1.0] and of the intermediaries contractual adjustment factor γ = [0.05, 1.0].
Notice that we set an upper bound for the entrepreneurs reserve utility equal to one because of the intrinsic characteristic of the interest rate function. In particular, the return of the single investment is dened as:
This function presents a point of maximum, whose solution is:
Given the discount factor β = 0.95 and the production function parameter α = 0.3, the maximum value of the rm prot compatible with the households steady-state condition (r = 1/β − 1) is equal to:
A contractual prot over this threshold will always return an interest rate lower than the households discount factor. Therefore, in that situation there will be an overall withdrawal of resources by families and, in the long run, a collapse of the economy to an equilibrium without production and consumption. In addition to this, rms' reserve utility posit a lower constraint on the intermediaries decision regarding the contractual prot. Indeed, values below this zero utility threshold will never meet entrepreneurs demand. In summary, to avoid a degenerate equilibrium and to leave enough decision space to the intermediaries in their job of choosing the optimal contractual prot, we decide to limit the study of the dynamic of the system up to this value of the rms reserve utility.
Finally, we constrain also the intermediaries adjustment factor to an upper bound equal to one. In fact, in this case the range of the percentage change of the banks contractual prot is equal to ±100%. Given that, we consider this limit suciently high for our purposes.
The system converges to a positive level of production and the number of intermediaries always remains above the degenerate equilibrium in which only one bank could be left in the economy (Figures 2, 3 and 4) . As expected, the value of the rms prots increases with the reserve utility. In accordance to this, the growth of the production quota left to the entrepreneur has a negative eect on the interest rate paid to the households and, in turn, on the accumulation of capital and on the overall level of production of the system (Figures 2 and 3) . Conversely, the intermediaries adjustment factor has a positive eect on the stability of the economy (Figures 2 and   5 ): a stronger reactivity of the nancial system anticipates the formation of the cycles and dampens their eects. However, this characteristics comes with a drawback. In those situations in which the entrepreneurs reserve utility and, in turn, the lower bound for the contractual prot are high, an excessive responsiveness of the intermediaries increases the number of times in which the rms contractual prot exceed the households steadystate condition dened in equation (23). This explains the low number of intermediaries and the reduced level of production in high reserve utility and high contractual adjustment factor regions.
To end with, we also notice that the level of unallocated capital in the system increases with the rms reserve utility and with the intermediaries adjustment factor (Figure 6 ). At the same time, the rms extra prot (P − θ − xR) decrease along those directions ( Figure 7) . As we will explain in the next section, this feature of the system is connected to the proximity of these points to the no entry condition and to the maximum production limit. 
Credit cycles
An emerging feature of the stylized economy introduced here is the presence of endogenous credit cycles. To study the mechanisms behind these movements and to capture all the properties of the system we chose to analyse an intermediate combination of parameters, namely (θ = 0.5 ∧ γ = 0.5).
During periods of economic growth the system experience an increase in the productivity of rms and in the average interest rate paid by the intermediaries to the households (Figures 9 and 10 ). At the same time, the volume of unallocated resources reaches its maximum level (Figure 12 ), the average contractual prot decreases ( Figure 11 ) and there is an expansion in the number of new credit line and a simultaneous contraction in loans closure ( Figure 13 and Figure 14) . Conversely, during economic downturns the interest rate and the rms productivity collapse (Figures 9 and 10 ), contractual prots increase ( Figure 11 ) and in the initial phase of the crisis the volume of rms switching between intermediaries hikes, with a slow process of absorption in subsequent periods (Figure 14) . Finally, the credit market experiences a fast compression, with a rise in the quantity of intermediaries reducing the number of loans and a decline in the amount of banks oering new lending contracts (Figure 13 ).
The main drivers of this dynamic are the existence of a strategic complementarity in the intermediaries' behaviour and the presence of a strong inter-rm competition. All these aspects are then amplied by an allocative friction which modies the productivity of the rms and widens the reactivity of the system.
To understand the logic behind these uctuations it is useful to start from the beginning of an expansionary phase. In that situation interest rates are higher than the households discount factor and therefore families have the incentive to save. At the same time, the amount of unallocated capital uctuates around zero. Because of the positive conjuncture, contractual prots start following a decreasing trend through a self-reinforcing mechanism: when an intermediary experiences a withdraw of funds it recognizes that all its resources were invested in the preceding period and that it is leaving an excessively high production quota to the rms. In the light of this evidence, the bank decreases the contractual prot on new loans. From the point of view of the entrepreneurs, only new entrants have thus the incentive to borrow at the new conditions, hence leading to a positive inow of rms.
This fact combined with a xed amount of capital in the short run and a production function with decreasing marginal returns bring to an increase in the total productivity of the economy and to a rise in the total volume of production. In addition to this, the reduction of the contractual prot leads to a further growth in interest rates and in the households propensity to save.
The incentive for all the intermediaries to reduce contractual prots holds as long as the amount of unallocated resources is low. Therefore, when there is a decrease in the demand for new loans this policy stops being optimal and a reversal in the trend starts. This situation happens when the contractual prot approaches the zero prot condition (Figure 11) . Notice that the turnaround in contractual prots does not start immediately: even though there is an excess of unallocated capital, the increase in the overall productivity of the system prevents interest rates from falling below the households discount factor (Figures 9 and 10) . Because of this, families still have the incentive to save at a lower but positive growth rate and to avoid a sudden and unexpected withdraw of funds. In other words, as long as the margin of intermediation of the banks remains suciently wide, these have the opportunity and the incentive to keep supplying new credit to the rms at the current market condition.
From a theoretical point of view this dynamic should converge to a stable equilibrium: the combined eects of high rm productivity and excess of capital should oset each others in the long run, producing a margin of intermediation and an interest rate compatible with the households discount factor. But the existence of a strategic complementarity in the intermediaries behaviour and the presence of a strong inter-rm competition limit the permanence of the economy at this equilibrium. Indeed, when the margin of intermediation of the single bank starts to squeeze because of a reduction in rms productivity, this has the incentive to increase the contractual prot on new loans to attract new counterparts. From the point of view of the intermediary this choice has a positive eect on its protability because it reduces the volume of unallocated resources, but at the level of the whole economy it produces a decrease in the overall productivity of the system. In fact, the new contractual prot attracts not only new entrants, but also incumbent entrepreneurs ( Figure 14) . Therefore, at the aggregate level the same amount of capital is distributed across a smaller number of rms, with a decrease in the total productivity of the system (Figure 10 ). This in turn reduces the interest rate paid to households (Figure 9 ), driving them to start a withdrawal of deposits. Finally, as in the growing phase of the cycle, this downward trend is self-reinforcing. Indeed, other intermediaries recognize that they are accumulating an excess of unallocated resources because of their uncompetitive contractual prot. Hence, their optimal policy is to increase the prot quota on new loans. This results in an upward trend in contractual prot (Figure 11 ), a reduction in interest rates and rms productivity (Figures 9 and 10) and to an overall withdrawal of resources by the households, which in turn produces a compression of the credit market ( Figure 13) . Finally, the crisis stops when all the unallocated resources are depleted and the banks start again to decrease the contractual prot.
The endogenous cyclicality of the system is thus due to the interaction between the behaviours of intermediaries and rms. The absence of one of these two elements would in fact have prevented the beginning of the downward phase of the cycle.
In addition to this, from this study emerges that the level of unallocated resources of the intermediaries and the dierence between the contractual prot and the reserve utility of rms are strictly connected to the phase of the cycle. This explains why dierent sets of parameters, which are characterized by dissimilar cyclicalities, have distinct levels of unallocated funds.
In particular, economic systems featuring low volatility have also on aver- 
Bank run and persistent slump
In the preceding section we have shown that most of the movements in the system are the results of the interaction between rms and intermediaries.
Households simply react to changes in the interest rate generated by the behaviour of these agents. In this section we will study the eects of a bank run, namely a sudden and unexpected withdrawal of resources by depositors.
The idea is to understand the role played by banks creditors in the formation and in the destruction of lending relations. In addition to this, we will investigate whether the overall economic condition inuences the outcome of this event.
The simplest way to model a bank run is to constrain the deposit decisions of the households. Specically, we prevent a subset of families from depositing their capital after they have withdraw it. We perform this experiment In both experiments the volume of unallocated resources are approximately the same. In particular, we chose to withdraw an amount of deposits equal to the average ratio between liquidity and capital. Indeed, the idea is to conduct a shock whose dimensions are equivalent to the normal uctuations of the system. For the TBR experiment we pick at random a subset of banks whose liabilities represent this capital quota, while for the GBR we chose a group of households which hold in overall the same amount of resources. To obtain a suciently high number of results we conduct 150 bank run of each type on a simulation of 10000 periods starting from the same random seed.
The timing of the shock is then selected casually from a timespan between 4000 and 7000 periods. Finally, the experiment is repeated over four dierent combination of parameters: γ = 0.35 ∧ θ = 0.35, γ = 0.35 ∧ θ = 0.7, γ = 0.7 ∧ θ = 0.35 and γ = 0.7 ∧ θ = 0.7.
It clearly appears that the GBR has a smaller and only temporary eect on the economy (Figures 15, 16, 17 and 18) . The reason behind this outcome is to be found in the destruction of credit lines. Indeed, by construction the only dierence in the two methodologies is the allocation of the bank run: while in the GBR it is spread across all the intermediaries, in the TBR it is concentrated on a small subset of them. Therefore, the diusion of the shock throughout banks dampens its eects and reduces the number of credit lines which are destroyed. This is due to the fact that, on average, there is always a positive, even if small, amount of unallocated capital in the intermediaries balance sheet. In the GBR treatment, banks have thus the opportunity to draw resources from that entry instead of closing a credit line. Conversely, in the TBR all the loans connected to a specic intermediary are closed.
This fact explains why shocks show conicting outcomes for dierent sets of parameters. In fact, systems in which the average level of unallocated funds is low are subject to deeper and persistent recessions (Figures 15 and 17 ). Conversely, economies characterized by a higher level of uninvested capital are able not only to manage properly the shock, but also to improve their steady-state performance (Figures 16 and 18) . Indeed, in these cases rms which suer an unexpected closure of their credit lines can immediately borrow from other intermediaries. Therefore, the economy recovers faster and it is also able in the short run to allocate most of the exceeding capital inherited from the preceding period. In this way, in the long run this indirect rationalization of investments rises the overall productivity of the system, with an increase in both the production level and the protability of rms. On the contrary, in an economy with a low level of unallocated capital the intermediaries are not able to cover all the additional demand for funds. Furthermore, in subsequent periods namely, when the resources are reinvested in the economy by the households banks start to decrease the contractual prot they oer in order to improve their protability by exploiting this excess of demand. Therefore, the overall results in the short run are a reduction of the credit demand and a persistent accumulation of unallocated capital. Due to this fact, households have thus the incentive to withdraw and consume this excess of resources, and the economy converges in the long run to a lower steady-state equilibrium.
These results are conrmed through an analysis of recovery times, namely the time required for the economy to reach the same level of production that would have been obtained if there had not been the bank run. In particular, we regress the logarithm of the recovery time on the logarithm of the production level for the TBR at the moment of the shock (Table 2) . Estimates conrm the preceding intuition: recovery times are highly signicant for economies with low volumes of unallocated capital. Specically, an economy which is hit by a bank run in a moment characterized by an elevated level of production and uninvested resources requires a shorter time to recover.
Clearly, for economies with high levels of unallocated funds this results does not hold because of their intrinsic characteristics. To conrm this nding we analyse also the recovery time for the GBR and, as expected, the estimations produce completely dierent results (Table 3) .
Finally, we observe that recovery times in the GBR and in the TBR are nearer in moments of high production (Figure 19 ). This nding is clearly in line with the preceding analysis of the shock: the dampening of the bank run is strictly connected to the overall level of unallocated capital of the system. In other words, it is the destruction of the credit lines which amplies the shock: an economy in which the overall nancial system can easier substitute a defaulted intermediary in its job of loan issuance will suer minor losses.
Concluding remarks
This paper has developed a simple agent-based model of bank-intermediated credit ows in which information imperfections give rise to search frictions and resource misallocation. We have shown that credit and business cycles arise endogenously and co-evolve. The key driving mechanism is a pure competition eect, as banks struggle to manage their net interest margin through the activation and termination of loan relationships at varying interest rates in order to attract deposits. By assuming the possibility that banks can be aected by funding runs, we have also studied the macroeconomic impact of nancial crisis in terms of output losses and speed of recovery.
The model can be extended in a number of directions to consider important issues. First, we have so far ignored agency frictions. The probability a long-run loan contract is severed and, therefore, the extent of credit reallo- For reasons of tractability we have abstracted from the labor market or any other kind of physical production factors. As shown e.g. in Wasmer & Weil (2004) , general equilibrium feedbacks between the markets fornance and productive inputs can magnify the response of the economy to exogenous shocks through a nancial accelerator mechanism. Such an improvement could allow us to complement the story we oer here with an analysis of the way disruptions in nancial markets aect unemployment and economic activity, and vice-versa, by exploring the issues of how credit misallocation interacts with labor misallocation (Delli Gatti et al. 2012 ) and income distribution (Dosi et al. 2013 ).
Finally, an interesting extension would be that of studying the role of the central bank in smoothing the credit cycle and responding to liquidity crisis by acting as a lender-of-last-resort.
